The 1683 attack on Vienna reminded Europe what a danger the Ottoman Empire posed. Despite the additional threat to the Habsburg Monarchy (the 'Imperialists') and the Holy Roman Empire from the other direction, Louis XIV's France, the Emperor Leopold resolved to build on the 1683 alliance with Poland and try to drive the Ottomans out of Hungary. Venice joined in, and with vigorous support from Pope Innocent XI the 'Holy League' was formed in 1684, the first serious joint Christian attempt at a counter-attack against the Ottomans since 1444. Unfortunately, the French threat delayed an immediate full commitment of forces, and the campaign became an example of appallingly bad decision-making. Buda, the medieval capital of Hungary and since 1541 the forward base for the Ottomans in Hungary, was an obvious target, and with its antiquated defences seemed, to western officers accustomed to contemporary artillery fortification, a push-over. After initial victories in battle, the Imperialist army reached Buda. Ignoring the opinion of the only really qualified commander present, Ernst Rudiger von Starhemberg, political generals under Louis of Baden pushed through a decision to attack the fortress, expecting to take it in days, although their army had insufficient infantry, artillery and engineers for a siege. Days turned into months, with growing casualties and no prospect of success; the arrival of significant reinforcements under Elector Maximilian Emanuel of Bavaria should have helped, but he started a fresh attack against the strongest part of the defences. The Christian army eventually retreated with a death-toll of 23,000. Alongside the main campaign, the Imperialists operated smaller flanking armies that achieved minor successes: fighting the Hungarian rebels under Imre Thököly, and descending the River Drave to threaten the Ottoman lines of supply towards Buda. The book describes the opposing forces: the Imperialist and Bavarian armies on the Christian side and their Ottoman opponents, briefly since these are well-known and covered in other Helion publications, and in more detail the lesser-known Hungarians. It also includes summaries of the other theatres of war: the Polish (a failed campaign) and Venetian (a good start). The account of the siege itself is based on contemporary reports, and the published correspondence of Starhemberg, set against the more famous but partisan account of the Baden party. Reports of the famous Italian soldier-scholar Marsigli are also used, though he does not come out well. Two published sources cover the Ottoman side: a Hungarian diary from within the siege and a translation of the detailed account of the contemporary Ottoman chronicler 'Silahdar'. A serious effort has been made to represent the Hungarian point of view, particularly of loyalists rather than that of the rebel warlord Thököly; this was the last time an 'independent' contribution was made by Hungarians to the liberation of their own country. Despite the failure, Vienna remained committed to the war, and real progress in the reconquest of Hungary would begin in 1685. It is hoped to produce further books on those subsequent campaigns, including the eventual victory at Buda in 1686. AUTHOR: Alan Exelby has studied the War of the Holy League, and its background to the origins of Ottoman conquest, for over thirty years. He also has a general interest in all aspects of European military history and international relations, 1648-1802, and previously published a cited article on the Battle of Almansa (1707). He has worked for most of his life as a librarian at a university. A side-interest in classical history led to a period of enthusiastic ancient-Roman-style cooking, though (84) its high acid content led to abandoning this (suggesting another possible reason for the decline and fall). 22 b/w illustrations, 9 tables, 8 b/w maps, 8pp colour plates
